BDR mutiny and India's obligation

Bhaskar Roy, who retired recently as a senior government official with decades of national and international experience, is an expert on international relations and Indian strategic interests.

The Bangladesh Rifles’ (BDR) mutiny on the morning of February 25, 2009 at the force’s headquarters in Dhaka shows the serious threat Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government is facing. The revolt led by some junior officer and soldiers of the BDR continued to hold out for 34 hours till army tanks surrounded them and forced the mutineers to surrender. About 71 army officers on secondment to the BDR including Director General Maj. Gen. Shakeel Ahmed and his wife were killed in the first two hours.

Officers and soldiers had gathered for the BDR raising day for a week of celebrations. The BDR personnel had certain genuine grievances about pay and perquisites including deputation to lucrative UN peace-keeping missions. But the scale of massacre did not justify that. Even children of army officers were not spared. The act replicated the rape and massacre of innocent Bangladeshis in 1971 by the Pakistani army and their Bengali acolytes, the Al Badr and Al Shams created by the JEI, its students wing the ICS and other Pro-Pakistani anti-liberation Islamic forces.

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Bangladesh Commerce Minister Faruk Khan declared the mutiny was a plot to sabotage the trial of the 1971 war criminals, but promised the trials will be held. Sheikh Hasina admitted that the conspirators would not rest and were hatching new plans. Investigators examining telephone intercepts said their plans for the revolt was made at least two months in advance, suggesting the conspiracy may have started just after the Awami League won the December 29, 2008 Parliament elections.

Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Tawhidul Alam, leader of the mutiny, confessed to the investigators that outsiders were involved. It is also significant that most of the soldiers involved were recruits of recent years when the JEI had pushed in a large number of their people into the BDR. Sheikh Hasina’s decision to bring to justice the 1971 war criminals and the 1975 assassins of her father Sheikh Muijibur Rahman and other top leaders of the party not only agitated the criminals now living in Bangladesh, but also the militants and the ISI in Pakistan who were involved in both 1971 and 1975 violence.

Two days before the mutiny, Pakistan’s Special Envoy Pervez Ispahani was in Dhaka to plead with Awami League Foreign Minister Dipu Moni not to reopen the war criminals’ trials. Ispahani’s request was not acceded to. He also met Khaleda Zia.

The sector Commander’s Forum, an organization of liberation war heroes who have been demanding trial of the war criminals for years, have prepared a list in which the names of 12 Pakistani service military officers including generals, figure. Others in the list include top leaders of the JEI and some who have joined the BNP like Salauddin Qader Choudhury. The trials would certainly lead to convictions since many eye-witnesses are still alive, and documents available.

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The trials would have wide implications. The JEI and its stringer groups could be politically and socially debilitated for a long time to come. It could impact the BNP in two ways. Khaleda’s late husband, war hero Zia-ur-Rehman as army chief is suspected to have had some involvement by omission or commission in Sk. Mujibur Rahman’s assassination. Begum Khaleda Zia is known to be a product of the Pakistani cantonment, having lived with Pakistani families in the Dhaka cantonment during the liberation war, refusing to join her husband.

For Pakistan, conviction of its affairs would be an opprobrium for its army. The 1971 war crimes are generally described as genocide. It would hurt Pakistan’s influence in Bangladesh. Generally, the Bangladeshi army have been against the trial of war criminals. But for about two years now Gen. Moeen U Ahmed has been favouring their trial. Hence, the conspiracy to discredit Moeen and the army, destabilize the country, and oust Awami League and Sheikh Hasina from the government.

Sheikh Hasina acted with great politically maturity and had an equally mature ally in the army Chief. Any immediate army action would have led to a blood bath, and thousands of BDR personnel were at the headquarters who were not involved. A bloodbath is what the conspirators wanted. Sheikh Hasina may have won the battle, but the war is still on, and will not end easily. The threat to her life has gone up manifold.

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Much would depend upon how Sheikh Hasina deals with the results of the investigations. Senior opposition leaders including Khaleda Zia may be implicated. If Sheikh Hasina deals with the issue only politically and enters into a compromise, she will be signing her own death warrant and that of Bangladesh’s. Apart from revamping the BDR and the various intelligence organizations, she must review if military officers should man intelligence organizations. The Pakistan structure has shown what can happen in such a case.

Pakistan’s active interest in the 1971 war criminal trials should encourage Bangladesh to review military and intelligence ties with Pakistan. The DGFI is under significant ISI influence.

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If Sheikh Hasina is incapacitated or eliminated, the Awami Leagaue could go into disarray. There is no effective second in command. Some of the senior party leaders have been side lined. It could lead to a serious power struggle between the sidelined old guard who still have some influence among the workers, and the youth and student bodies of the party. A vacuum could allow an opportunity to the rightists, Islamists and the anti-liberation forces. Most importantly, the army could get divided, or an army coup may result. None of these scenarios portend a stable Bangladesh. India’s security concerns would also be affected.

India, on the other hand, has a legitimate obligation, if not responsibility, to see that a neighbour with more than four thousand kilometres of common borders remained stable. A 1975 kind of inaction on New Delhi’s part could be potentially disastrous.

The views expressed in the column are the author’s and not of Sify.com