The perils of diverting the Brahmaputra

Dai affirmed that Premier Wen and President Hu, respectively trained as geological and hydraulic engineers, did not turn up at the opening function of the dam because they knew 'the risks of the project'.

In the post-Fukushima era, it is logical to expect that governments would honestly study the geology around these mega projects.

These 'irreversible' issues should also trigger fresh research into the most seismic region on the planet: the Tibetan plateau.

Will officials planning the construction of myriads of dams on the Tibetan rivers take into account the seismic conditions before starting the constructions? This cannot be solved once dams are built.

In this context, it is very unfortunate that for the first time in five years, a Chinese official spoke of the possibility on diverting the Yarlung-Tsangpo/Brahmaputra towards northern China.

The website 2point6billion.com quoted Wang Guangqian, a scholar of the Chinese Academy of Sciences saying: "Chinese experts have raised a new proposal to divert water from the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra River to the country’s northwestern province of Xinjiang. The water diversion route in the proposal, named the ‘Grand Western Canal’, is slightly different from the ‘Western Canal’ mentioned in China’s well-known South-North Water Diversion Project."

The rationale: China needs water

Wang explained the Chinese rationale: "Faced with severe challenges brought by reduced water resources and a severe drought that has affected a large portion of the country, China has started to consider diverting water from the Brahmaputra River, the watercourse that originates upstream from southwestern Tibet and finally enters India."

Three important factors have to be understood.

One, China's hydropower lobbies have a financial interest in 'concretizing' the project as soon as possible. A couple of weeks ago, an article in The Financial Times affirmed: "China's Three Gorges Project Corporation has proposed a $15bn hydropower scheme to Pakistan to dam the Indus river valley at several points, in a project aimed at controlling floods and tackling electricity shortages." Dams, whether in Pakistan or Tibet, mean big business and the large Chinese corporations will continue to lobby hard to get these projects through.

The second crucial factor is the cost-benefit perspective. The Chinese leadership is down-to-earth, rational. A friend who worked on the issue told me: "If the price of diverting water is cheaper than conservation or getting water from the sea, China will go ahead."

When it makes its calculations, Beijing will hopefully take into account the cost of serious tensions, if not a war, with India. The price of water may then become exorbitant.

Three, it remains that China badly needs water and can't import it.

The diversion of the Brahmaputra is today in competition with another diversion: to take water from the Bohai Sea, the innermost gulf of the Yellow Sea on the coast of Northeastern China and push it up to Xinxiang.

At the end of the day, China still needs to:
Stop the desertification in Xinjiang, Gansu and Inner Mongolia
Help a dry and polluted Yellow River flow again
Feed its people, for which large amounts of water are required for agriculture

If such grandiose and seemingly unrealizable projects are even thought of, it is because the situation is quite desperate and nobody is able to foresee any 'realizable' solution.

China's official position

The last time that we officially heard about the diversion of the Brahmaputra was in November 2006 just before President Hu Jintao's visit to India. China had decided to assuage the legitimate worries of the Indian government.

Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng, a hydraulic engineer, affirmed then that the proposal was "unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific. There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects."

He however admitted that there was a plan in the drawers, but "the project involves major financial and technical difficulties."

At that time, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao also confirmed: "The Chinese government has no plans to build a dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (the China part of the Brahmaputra) to divert water to the Yellow River."

The Chinese media criticized Li Ling's book Tibet's Water Will Save China in which the Chinese engineer details the diversion scheme, also known as Shuomatan Canal (from Suma Tan in Tibet to Tanjing in China).
As President Hu arrived in Delhi, other Chinese 'experts' were engaged to denounce the plans of Li Ling and Gao Kai (a retired PLA General and proponent of the project).

Qin Hui, a professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Tsinghua University declared: "We have to take the international response into consideration. It is undoubted that the lower reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo River are within India's Assam Province, where it is a lifeline for local agriculture and backbone of the economy, just as it is further downstream in Bangladesh."

Qin added: "It is so obvious that the proposed damming project will have a cascading effect leading to a natural disaster in the lower foreign reaches of the Brahmaputra, Salween and Mekong rivers."

Liu Changming, a hydrologist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences who has advised the government on these proposals, confirmed that a team of water experts from the Chinese Academy of Engineers, an advisory group of prominent scientists "had concluded that the proposal to tap the Brahmaputra River would be far too expensive, technologically unfeasible and ...too controversial." He nevertheless admitted: "There may be some retired officials that support the plan, but they're not the experts advising the government." It was five years ago.

Now, Prof Wang Guangqian of the Chinese Academy of Sciences seems to say that China has no choice but to do it.

Wang Guangqian speaks of a newly proposed route: "Brahmaputra waters are expected to be rerouted to Xinjiang along the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the Hexi Corridor" - part of the Northern Silk Road located in Gansu Province. Wang admitted "We thought this would be a plan 50 years later," adding that presently Chinese experts and governmental officials are still studying the feasibility and possible impacts of distinct proposals.

There is a big difference between 2006 and today: with the opening of the tunnel to Metok (Motuo) in December 2010, the Chinese engineers now have the possibility to start another mega power plant which could provide the necessary energy to the diversion scheme, planned a couple of hundred kilometers upstream the Brahmaputra.

No collaboration with neighbours

So far, China has refused to collaborate with downstream States. In May 1997, when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, China was one of three countries voting against. The rather mild Convention "aimed at guiding States in negotiating agreements on specific watercourses."

In the long run, whether it will be by adopting such a Convention or by signing a bilateral treaty like the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) between India and Pakistan, Beijing has no choice but to collaborate with its downstream neighbours on a crucial issue like water on which the future of Asia depends. The current 'imperialist' attitude does not tally with the status of 'responsible power' which China is striving for.

Also read: China in 2011: Smiles or threats?  | What ails US intelligence?

Born in France, Claude Arpi's quest began 36 years ago with a journey to the Himalayas. Since then he has been a student of the history of Tibet, China and the subcontinent. He is the author of numerous English and French books. His book, Tibet: the Lost Frontier (Lancers Publishers) was released recently.

More columns by Claude Arpi